Diskussion:Publikumskonferenz/Themenseite/Griechenland/Analyse: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen
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==== UN will 9 Grundsätze für Staatsinsolvenzen verabschieden! ==== | ==== UN will 9 Grundsätze für Staatsinsolvenzen verabschieden! ==== | ||
| − | Auf der kommenden UN-Generalversammlung sollen 9 Grundsätze zur Bewältigung von Staatsinsolvenzen verabschiedet werden. Ein Komitee der Vereinten Nationen, genauer United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), hat auf Veranlassung von Argentinien | + | Auf der kommenden UN-Generalversammlung sollen 9 Grundsätze zur Bewältigung von Staatsinsolvenzen verabschiedet werden. Ein Komitee der Vereinten Nationen, genauer United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), hat auf Veranlassung von Argentinien Internationaöle Grundsätze zum Umgang mit Staatsinsolvenzen erarbeitet und einstimmig beschlossen. |
[url=http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1047][b]Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes[/b][/url] | [url=http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1047][b]Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes[/b][/url] | ||
| + | (Prinzipien für staatliche Schuldenumstrukturierungsprozesse) | ||
1. A Sovereign State has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, (...) | 1. A Sovereign State has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, (...) | ||
2. Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail their engagement in (...) | 2. Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail their engagement in (...) | ||
| Zeile 141: | Zeile 142: | ||
8. Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and (...) | 8. Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and (...) | ||
9. Majority restructuring implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified majority (...) | 9. Majority restructuring implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified majority (...) | ||
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| + | Auf Telepolis ist Ralf Streck im seinem Artikel: [url=http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/45/45664/1.html][b]"Historischer Durchbruch" zum Recht auf Staats-Umschuldung[/b][/url] angesichts der Schuldenkrise in Griechenland mehr als erstaunt darüber: | ||
| + | [quote]dass im deutschsprachigen Raum die Tatsache praktisch unbeachtet blieb, dass ein Komitee der Vereinten Nationen (UN) kürzlich auf Anstoß von Argentinien einstimmig Grundsätze zum Umgang mit Staatsinsolvenzen beschlossen hat. Die UN-Generalversammlung wird aller Voraussicht nach am 15. September die "neun Grundsätze" beschließen, damit ein "neuer Rechtsrahmen" und "Regulierungsmechanismen" für den Umgang mit Staatsschuldenkrisen entstehen. Nun geht es darum, die "Gläubigervereinigung" IWF aus der Kontrolle herauszuhalten.[/quote] | ||
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| + | :Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes | ||
| + | :1. A Sovereign State has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, to design its macroeconomic policy, including restructuring its sovereign debt, which should not be frustrated or impeded by any abusive measures. Restructuring should be done as the last resort and preserving at the outset creditors' rights. | ||
| + | :2. Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail their engagement in constructive sovereign debt restructuring workout negotiations and other stages of the process with the aim of a prompt and durable reestablishment of debt sustainability and debt servicing, as well as achieving the support of a critical mass of creditors through a constructive dialogue regarding the restructuring terms. | ||
| + | :3. Transparency should be promoted in order to enhance the accountability of the actors concerned, which can be achieved through the timely sharing of both data and processes related to sovereign debt workouts. | ||
| + | :4. Impartiality requires that all institutions and actors involved in sovereign debt restructuring workouts, including at the regional level, in accordance with their respective mandates, enjoy independence and refrain from exercising any undue influence over the process and other stakeholders or engaging in actions that would give rise to conflicts of interest or corruption or both. | ||
| + | :5. Equitable treatment imposes on States the duty to refrain from arbitrarily discriminating among creditors, unless a different treatment is justified under the law, is reasonable, and is correlated to the characteristics of the credit, guaranteeing inter-creditor equality, discussed among all creditors. Creditors have the right to receive the same proportionate treatment in accordance with their credit and its characteristics. No creditors or creditor groups should be excluded ex ante from the sovereign debt restructuring process. | ||
| + | :6. Sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and execution regarding sovereign debt restructurings is a right of States before foreign domestic courts and exceptions should be restrictively interpreted. | ||
| + | :7. Legitimacy entails that the establishment of institutions and the operations related to sovereign debt restructuring workouts respect requirements of inclusiveness and the rule of law, at all levels. The terms and conditions of the original contracts should remain valid until such time as they are modified by a restructuring agreement. | ||
| + | :8. Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and lead to a stable debt situation in the debtor State, preserving at the outset creditors' rights while promoting sustained and inclusive economic growth and sustainable development, minimizing economic and social costs, warranting the stability of the international financial system and respecting human rights. | ||
| + | :9. Majority restructuring implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified majority of the creditors of a State are not to be affected, jeopardized or otherwise impeded by other States or a non-representative minority of creditors, who must respect the decisions adopted by the majority of the creditors. States should be encouraged to include collective action clauses in their sovereign debt to be issued. | ||
| + | |||
| + | http://www.unctad.info/en/Debt-Portal/ | ||
== Interview == | == Interview == | ||
[https://soundcloud.com/rebootfm/make-capitalism-history-griechische-schuldenkrise2015-07-08 reboot.fm - Make Capitalism History - Interview Karl Heinz Roth: Griechische Schuldenkrise] | [https://soundcloud.com/rebootfm/make-capitalism-history-griechische-schuldenkrise2015-07-08 reboot.fm - Make Capitalism History - Interview Karl Heinz Roth: Griechische Schuldenkrise] | ||
Version vom 9. August 2015, 01:23 Uhr
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Infolink
- Warum Schäuble Griechenland aus der Eurozone drängen will - Transform Network Germany won’t spare Greek pain – it has an interest in breaking us - The Guardian Behind Germany’s refusal to grant Greece debt relief – Op-Ed in The Guardian - Yanis Varoufakis Update - Reuters.com
- “Unsere Schlacht, Griechenland zu retten” – Interview mit Varoufakis (de)
- Insider-Enthüllung aus dem Herzen der Euro-Gruppe – Yanis Varoufakis: „Unser Parlament wurde wie Müll behandelt.“ - RT deutsch
- Yanis Varoufakis full transcript: our battle to save Greece - NewStatesman
- Egalitarianism’s Latest Foe: a critical review of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century - Yanis Varoufakis (PDF-Kom) darauf wird in Text verwiesen
- Exclusive: Yanis Varoufakis opens up about his five month battle to save Greece - NewStatesman
- »Wir haben ihre Macht unterschätzt«: Ein Insider der griechischen Regierung legt Details aus fünf Monaten »Erniedrigung« und »Erpressung« offen - Zeitschrift Luxemburg (de)
- Economy - Document: 'We underestimated their power': Greek government insider lifts the lid on five months of 'humiliation' and 'blackmail' mediapart.fr 08 July 2015
»Sie haben uns in die Falle gelockt« - Neues Deutschland
Zum Rücktritt von Yanis Varoufakis: Der gescheiterte Europäer - The European Rücktritt 06.07.2015
»Ein Karthagischer Frieden« - ND Von Yanis Varoufakis
„It’s Time to Kick Germany Out of the Eurozone“ 14. Juli 2015 viele belegende Statistiken, Grafiken und Tab. Hochinteressant
Eine Europrophezeiung aus dem Jahr 1992 - Finanz und Wirtschaft
Maastricht and All That - Wynne Godley - London Review of Books
Yanis Varoufakis: "Zu Schäubles Plan gehörte es, Griechenland fallen zu lassen" - Zeit-Online Dr Schäuble’s Plan for Europe: Do Europeans approve? – Article to appear in Die Zeit on Thursday 16th July 2015 Schuldenkrise: Dr. Schäubles Plan für Europa - Yanis Varoufakis - Zeit-Online
Yanis Varoufakis: Europas rachsüchtiger Privatisierungsplan für Griechenland - Project Syndicate
Griechenlands Ex-Finanzminister Varoufakis: "Wir haben Fehler gemacht" - spiegel.de
Faktencheck
Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung
- Eine Chronologie: 100 Tage SYRIZA - Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung einfach nur GUT
- nd Dossier: Griechischer Frühling SYRIZA - Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung
- Wider das Recht: Ein Gutachten zur Unrechtmäßigkeit der EZB-Aktivitäten im Rahmen der autoritären Kürzungspolitiken der Troika Wider das Recht - Gutachten (pdf)
Beliebte Irrtümer in der Schuldenkrise.
- «Verkauft doch eure Inseln, ihr Pleite-Griechen!» - Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung
- «Schummel-Griechen machen unseren Euro kaputt» - Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung
The Press Project
- Varoufakis: “Why I Voted ‘YES’ Tonight” - The Press Project.gr
- Varoufakis: Why I voted NO - The Press Project.gr
- The fund they want Greek assets transferred to is managed by … Schäuble - The Press Project.gr
- Piketty: Europe΄s leaders saved the banks, not Greece - The Press Project.gr
- SPECIAL REPORT: European Commission interfering with the Greek banking system - The Press Project.gr
- Secrets of the Brussels media machine - The Press Project.gr
- Griechenland-Krise: Warum die einfachen Wahrheiten nicht stimmen - blog.campact.de Viele Medien zeichnen ein verzerrtes Bild. Wir glauben: Um sich ein fundiertes Urteil über die Griechenland-Krise zu bilden, sollte man diese Fakten kennen.
Älter
http://www.spiegelblog.net/tsipras_geisterfahrer.html
http://www.balkanforum.info/f9/nachrichten-griechenland-211604/index1120.html#post4274018
Dominique Strauss Kahn
http://de.slideshare.net/DominiqueStraussKahn/150718-tweeteurope https://image.slidesharecdn.com/150718-tweet-europe-150718112749-lva1-app6892/95/to-my-german-friends-4-638.jpg https://image.slidesharecdn.com/150718-tweet-europe-150718112749-lva1-app6892/95/to-my-german-friends-5-638.jpg https://image.slidesharecdn.com/150718-tweet-europe-150718112749-lva1-app6892/95/to-my-german-friends-6-638.jpg
Der Plan B mit hijacking und hacking - Info
Varoufakis claims had approval to plan parallel banking system - ekathimerini.com
Contingency Plans - Paul Krugman
Reports Of Secret Drachma Plots Leave Tsipras Facing Fresh Crisis - Zerohedge.com
Spekulationen um einen linken „Plan B“ für einen Grexit - NachDenkSeiten.de
Griechenland Medien: Varoufakis wollte Drachme wieder einführen - Der Tagesspiegel
Möglicher Euro-Austritt Wirbel um Varoufakis' angeblichen Grexit-Plan - Tagesschau.de
So, I was going to "hijack" Greek citizens' tax file numbers? Impressed by my defamers' imagination. - @yanisvaroufakisekathimerini.com/199945/article …
Varoufakis unplugged The transcript Yanis Varoufakis and the Plan B omfif-telephone-briefing-greece-and-europe-after-the-brussels-debt-agreement-yanis-varoufakis-16-july.mp4 - Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) Live-stream Mitschnitt - SoundCloud Business live: Yanis Varoufakis defends secret plan B; Chinese stocks tumble - as it happened
OT: Yanis Varoufakis: Romantiker gegen Pragmatiker - Zeit-Online
Yanis Varoufakis erklärt in einem neuen Buch seinem Kind, warum die Griechen nichts für ihre Situation können.
Chatham-House-Regel
"When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s),
nor that of any other participant, may be revealed". - See more at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule/translations#sthash.adHm0Naj.dpuf
Chatham House Rule in German:
Bei Veranstaltungen (oder Teilen von Veranstaltungen), die unter die Chatham-House-Regel fallen, ist den Teilnehmern die freie Verwendung der erhaltenen Informationen unter der Bedingung gestattet,
dass weder die Identität noch die Zugehörigkeit von Rednern oder anderen Teilnehmern preisgegeben werden dürfen.
Quelle: chathamhouse.org
Public Debt Management Agency
Public Debt Management Agency - Leiter: General Secretary of Fiscal Policy of the Ministry of Finance PDMA - Economic Indicators
UN will 9 Grundsätze für Staatsinsolvenzen verabschieden!
Auf der kommenden UN-Generalversammlung sollen 9 Grundsätze zur Bewältigung von Staatsinsolvenzen verabschiedet werden. Ein Komitee der Vereinten Nationen, genauer United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), hat auf Veranlassung von Argentinien Internationaöle Grundsätze zum Umgang mit Staatsinsolvenzen erarbeitet und einstimmig beschlossen.
[url=http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1047][b]Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes[/b][/url] (Prinzipien für staatliche Schuldenumstrukturierungsprozesse) 1. A Sovereign State has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, (...) 2. Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail their engagement in (...) 3. Transparency should be promoted in order to enhance the accountability of the actors concerned, (...) 4. Impartiality requires that all institutions and actors involved in sovereign debt restructuring workouts, (...) 5. Equitable treatment imposes on States the duty to refrain from arbitrarily discriminating among creditors, (...) 6. Sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and execution regarding sovereign debt restructurings is a right of States (...) 7. Legitimacy entails that the establishment of institutions and the operations related to sovereign debt restructuring (...) 8. Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and (...) 9. Majority restructuring implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified majority (...)
Auf Telepolis ist Ralf Streck im seinem Artikel: [url=http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/45/45664/1.html][b]"Historischer Durchbruch" zum Recht auf Staats-Umschuldung[/b][/url] angesichts der Schuldenkrise in Griechenland mehr als erstaunt darüber:
[quote]dass im deutschsprachigen Raum die Tatsache praktisch unbeachtet blieb, dass ein Komitee der Vereinten Nationen (UN) kürzlich auf Anstoß von Argentinien einstimmig Grundsätze zum Umgang mit Staatsinsolvenzen beschlossen hat. Die UN-Generalversammlung wird aller Voraussicht nach am 15. September die "neun Grundsätze" beschließen, damit ein "neuer Rechtsrahmen" und "Regulierungsmechanismen" für den Umgang mit Staatsschuldenkrisen entstehen. Nun geht es darum, die "Gläubigervereinigung" IWF aus der Kontrolle herauszuhalten.[/quote]
- Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes
- 1. A Sovereign State has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, to design its macroeconomic policy, including restructuring its sovereign debt, which should not be frustrated or impeded by any abusive measures. Restructuring should be done as the last resort and preserving at the outset creditors' rights.
- 2. Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail their engagement in constructive sovereign debt restructuring workout negotiations and other stages of the process with the aim of a prompt and durable reestablishment of debt sustainability and debt servicing, as well as achieving the support of a critical mass of creditors through a constructive dialogue regarding the restructuring terms.
- 3. Transparency should be promoted in order to enhance the accountability of the actors concerned, which can be achieved through the timely sharing of both data and processes related to sovereign debt workouts.
- 4. Impartiality requires that all institutions and actors involved in sovereign debt restructuring workouts, including at the regional level, in accordance with their respective mandates, enjoy independence and refrain from exercising any undue influence over the process and other stakeholders or engaging in actions that would give rise to conflicts of interest or corruption or both.
- 5. Equitable treatment imposes on States the duty to refrain from arbitrarily discriminating among creditors, unless a different treatment is justified under the law, is reasonable, and is correlated to the characteristics of the credit, guaranteeing inter-creditor equality, discussed among all creditors. Creditors have the right to receive the same proportionate treatment in accordance with their credit and its characteristics. No creditors or creditor groups should be excluded ex ante from the sovereign debt restructuring process.
- 6. Sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and execution regarding sovereign debt restructurings is a right of States before foreign domestic courts and exceptions should be restrictively interpreted.
- 7. Legitimacy entails that the establishment of institutions and the operations related to sovereign debt restructuring workouts respect requirements of inclusiveness and the rule of law, at all levels. The terms and conditions of the original contracts should remain valid until such time as they are modified by a restructuring agreement.
- 8. Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and lead to a stable debt situation in the debtor State, preserving at the outset creditors' rights while promoting sustained and inclusive economic growth and sustainable development, minimizing economic and social costs, warranting the stability of the international financial system and respecting human rights.
- 9. Majority restructuring implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified majority of the creditors of a State are not to be affected, jeopardized or otherwise impeded by other States or a non-representative minority of creditors, who must respect the decisions adopted by the majority of the creditors. States should be encouraged to include collective action clauses in their sovereign debt to be issued.
http://www.unctad.info/en/Debt-Portal/
Interview
reboot.fm - Make Capitalism History - Interview Karl Heinz Roth: Griechische Schuldenkrise
